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Prosecutorial Immunity: Imbler, Burns, and Now 
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons-The Supreme Court's 
Attempt t o  Provide Guidance 
in a Difficult ~ r e a *  
In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,' the Supreme Court for the 
third time directly addressed the issue of prosecutorial immu- 
 nit^.^ Since the Supreme Court first addressed prosecutors' 
immunity to civil suits brought under 42 U.S.C. 8 1983 in 
Imbler v. Pat~hman,~ lower courts have struggled with its 
b~undaries .~ Difficulty in this area can be attributed to the 
lack of guidance provided by the Court in imbler5 and later in 
Burns v. Reed? Following Imbler and Burns, the Supreme 
Court in Buckley provided a needed standard for determining 
the limits of prosecutorial immunity. 
Determining the proper seope of prosecutorial immunity is  
difficult. The dilemma exists in part because improperly prose- 
cuted citizens warrant redress,' yet society has an interest in 
* I would like to thank my wife, Mimi, for her constant support and 
Professor C. Douglas Floyd for his time and assistance. Additionally, I wish to 
acknowledge Val Davis Day as the impetus for and the presence behind this Note. 
1. 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993). 
2. Prosecutorid immunity, in the context of this Note, generally refers to a 
prosecutor's immunity from suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). 
3. 424 U.S. 409 (1976). 
4. See BENNETT L. GEHSHMAN, PHOSECIJTOHIAL MISCONDUCT $ l3.7(a) (1993); 
John C. Filosa, Comment, Prosecutorial Immunity: No Place for Absolutes, 1983 U .  
ILL. L. REV. 977, 985-86 (explaining the inconsistent applications of the Imbler 
functional approach). 
5. "Drawing a proper line between these hndions may present difficult 
questions, but this case does not require us to anticipate them." 424 U.S. at 431 
11.33. 
6. 500 U.S. 478 (1991); see inj5-a part 1I.C. (explaining that aside from the 
Supreme Court recognizing a particular situation where absolute immunity would 
not be granted, Burns provided no more guidance than Imbler). 
7. "Privileges and immunities against responsibility are an anathema for a 
democratic society and most appropriately correctable by civil damage responsibili- 
ty." Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d 1287, 1302 (Wyo. 1990) (Urbigkit, J., dissent- 
ing), cert. granted and judgment vacated by 501 U.S. 1201 (1991); see also Susan 
M .  Cope, Comment, Immunizing the Investigating Prosecutor: Should the Dishonest 
Go Free or th.e Honest Defend?, 48 FOHDHAM L. REV. 1110 (1980) (explaining that 
individuals who claim a deprivation of their rights often resort to the federal fo- 
rum). 
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assuring that prosecutors are not diverted by civil suits from 
"their important duty of enforcing the criminal law."' In an 
attempt t o  provide guidance in this area, a fractured Court in 
Buckleyg provided a rational and clearly defined1' standard. 
The majority in Buckley held a "prosecutor neither is, nor 
should consider himself to be, an advocate [and therefore abso- 
lutely immune from suit] before he has probable cause to have 
anyone arrested."" Although only supported by a slight ma- 
jority of the Court,'' the Buckley probable cause standard pro- 
vides a workable method for determining the boundaries of 
prosecutorial immunity. 
This Note examines the Supreme Court's decision in 
Buckley13 and the issues left unresolved by the majority's 
probable cause standard. Part I1 provides a framework for 
understanding the Buckley decision by briefly explaining 42 
U.S.C. 5 1983 and related immunities. Additionally, Part I1 
summarizes Imbler and Burns. Part I11 outlines the facts, anal- 
ysis, and holding of Buckley. Part IV analyzes the Buckley 
standard for determining prosecutorial immunity and its un- 
derlying rationale. Part V explores issues that remain unan- 
swered after Buckley. This Note concludes that Buckley pro- 
vides pragmatic guidance in a difficult area and is a positive 
step in the evolution of prosecutorial immunity. 
8. Buns ,  500 U.S. at 485; see also Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d 
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950) ("Better to leave unredressed the 
wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to 
the constant dread of retaliation."). 
9. The Court's 4-1-4 decision illustrates the difficulty in setting clear, work- 
able boundaries regarding prosecutorial immunity. 
10. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2622 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (asserting the ma- 
jority "superimposed" a bright-line standard onto the functional approach used in 
previous decisions). 
11. Id. at 2616. 
12. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. Part of Justice 
Stevens' opinion was supported unanimously. See infra note 73 (discussing the 
unanimous portion of the decision). However, the part of Justice Stevens' opinion 
instituting the "bright line" standard, was joined only by Justices Blackmun, 
O'Comor, Scalia, and Thomas with Justice Scalia filing a concurring opinion. Jus- 
tice K e ~ e d y  wrote the dissenting opinion opposing the probable cause standard, 
which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Souter. 
13. The Note is limited to the Court's "bright line" (or probable cause) stan- 
dard for determining what prosecutorial hnctions are not absolutely immune from 
1983 civil suits. See infi-a part 111. B.  
PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY 
A. Section 1983 and Immunities Generally 
In 187114 Congress passed civil rights legislation that has 
become the primary "statutory vehicle used to remedy constitu- 
tional violations committed by state and local offi~ials."'~ The 
statute states in part: 
Every person who, under color of .any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the juris- 
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action a t  law, suit in equity, 
or other proper proceeding for redress.16 
Section 1983 by its terms creates no imrnunitie~. '~ I t im- 
poses liability upon "[elvery person" who, under color of state 
law, deprives others of their civil rights. Although $ 1983 ap- 
pears to create no immunities, the Supreme Court has held 
that 5 1983 must be read in harmony with general, common- 
law principles of tort immunity.18 The Court reasoned that 
immunities "well-grounded in  history" had not been displaced 
by the general language of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.19 
14. The Act passed in 1871 was modeled after section 2 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866. In part, because the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
was questioned, the Fourteenth Amendment was passed in 1868. Congress granted 
civil remedies for constitutional violations in the first section of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1871 to ensure the Fourteenth Amendment's "vitality." See A. Allise Burris, 
Note, Qualifying Immunity in Section 1983 and Bivens Actions, 71 TEX. L. REV. 
123, 131-32 (1992). 
15. See David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. 6 1983: Interpretive 
Approach and the Search for the kgislatiue Will, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 497, 497 
(1992). 
16. 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1988) (emphasis added). 
17. See Imbler v. Patchman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976) (stating the statute on 
its face admits of no immunities). 
18. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (citing common law cases 
addressing immunity and granting absolute immunity for judges acting within their 
jurisdiction); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951) (granting absolute 
immunity for state legislative committee acting within traditional legislative capaci- 
ty); see also City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 US.  247, 258 (1981) (Congress 
in 1871 expressed no intention to do away with immunities afforded state officials 
a t  common law). But see Burris, supra note 14, at 132 (stating the purpose of the 
act was "to redress wrongs by those who wore black robes during the day and 
white robes at night"). See generally Achtenberg, supra note 15, at 500-35 (analyz- 
ing and criticizing the Court's methods of legislative interpretation). 
19. Tennqy, 341 U.S. at 376; see also Imbler v. Patchman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 
666 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994 
Despite the language of $ 1983, the Supreme Court has 
recognized two general types of immunities under 
§ 1983-absolute and q~alified.~' In determining which immu- 
nity to grant, courts use a functional analy~is.~'  Those "func- 
tions" that were granted absolute immunity a t  common law" 
are generally given the same protection today.23 The Court 
has recognized that some officials perform special functions, 
which because of their similarity to functions that would have 
been immune when Congress enacted 8 1983 in 1871, deserve 
absolute protection." When applying the functional approach, 
courts must look to "the nature of the function performed, not 
the identity [or office] of the actor who performed it.'n5 If the 
(1976) ("The decision in Tenney established that 5 1983 is to be read in harmony 
with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation 
of them."). But see Achtenberg, supra note 15, a t  522-24; Jennifer A. Coleman, 42 
U.S.C. Section 1988: A Congressionally-Mandated Approach to the Construction of 
Section 1983, 19 INI). L. REV. 665, 676-79 (1986) (arguing that there was no "well- 
grounded" common law and that modern courts should not be required to search 
out common-law precedents). 
20. The following has been stated as to how absolute and qualified immunity 
relate to prosecutors: 
Absolute immunity, as the name suggests, bars all suits against the pros- 
ecutor. Qualified immunity, on the other hand, is an affirmative defense 
and bars actions only when the prosecutor can show that his actions did 
not "violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which 
a reasonable person would have known" or that there were "extraordinary 
circumstances" which prevented him from knowing those established stan- 
dards. 
GERSHMAN, supra note 4, at 5 13.7 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
818-19 (1982)). 
21. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2613 (1993) (citing Burns v. 
Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991)); Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 
2167 (1993) (applying the functional analysis to court reporters); see infra note 47 
(citing cases since Imbler u. Patchman applying the fimctional approach). See gener- 
ally Burris, supra note 14, at 150-60 (listing examples and explaining methods for 
determining functions granted immunity). 
22. "Judges, witnesses, and jurors have long been afforded absolute immunity 
for acts performed within the scope of their official capacities." Cope,  supra note 
7, at  1112. 
23. The Court has granted absolute immunity "whether 5 1983's history or 
purposes nonetheless counsel against recognizing the same immunity." Tower v. 
Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984). Additionally, the Court has stated: "[O]ur role is 
to  interpret the intent of Congress in enacting 3 1983, not to make a freewheeling 
policy choice." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986). 
24. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978); see, eg. ,  Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 731 (1982) (president); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judges); 
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-76 (1951) (legislators). 
25. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988); see John P. O'Connor, Note, 
His Honor, The Employer-No Longer Absolutely Immune for Hiring Decisions, 57 
U. Cm. L. REV. 1141 (1989). But see Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) (holding 
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function performed is not protected by absolute immunity, the 
state official is left with the defense of qualified immunity. 
Most state officials are entitled to qualified immunity.26 
The Supreme Court has stated, "Qualified immunity strikes a 
balance between compensating those who have been injured by 
official conduct and protecting government's ability to perform 
its traditional  function^."^^ The Court has held that qualified 
immunity protects state officials while they perform discretion- 
ary functions if their conduct does not violate established stat- 
utory or constitutional rights that a "reasonable person"28 
would have In more recent cases, the Supreme Court 
has stated, "As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it 
provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or 
those who knowingly violate the law.'"' The current standard 
for qualified immunity is much more protective and functional 
than the standard existing when the Supreme Court first ad- 
dressed prosecutorial imrn~nity.~'  
that a judge was judicially immune from suit for allegedly ordering police officers 
to bring attorney before judge and to use excessive force if necessary); Barbara E. 
Reed, Note, Obscuring the Lines of Judicial Immunity: An Analysis of Mireles v. 
Waco, 112 S. Ct. 286 (1991), 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 419 (1992). 
26. Hafer v. Melo, 112 S. Ct. 358, 363-64 (1991) ("This Court has refused to 
extend absolute immunity beyond a very limited class of officials . . . ."); see also 
Emily Froimson, Case Comment, Hafer v. Melo: Personal Liability of State Officers 
Under 42 U.S.C. 6 1983, 72 B.U. L. REV. 417 (1992). 
27. Wyatt v. Cole 112 S. Ct 1827, 1833 (1992); see also Kit Kinports, Quali- 
fied Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23 GA. L. REV. 
597, 600-07 (1989) (exploring the policies and precedents of qualified immunity); 
David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial 
Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23 (1989) 
(examining the doctrine of qualified immunity and its impact on the litigation of 
civil rights). 
28. The "reasonable person" standard was set forth in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 800, 801 (1982). Harlow eliminated the subjective prong of prior qualified 
immunity analysis. Id. a t  815-18. Before Harlow, courts were required to determine 
if the state official acted with the intent either to deprive the plaintiff of some 
constitutional right or to cause some other injury. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 
308, 322 (1975), overruled on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 
(1982). 
29. Harlow, 457 U.S. a t  818; see also Rudovsky, supra note 27, at 35. 
30. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); see also Burns v. Reed, 500 
U.S. 478, 495 (1991). 
31. In 1976, when the Court decided Imbler u. Patchman, qualified immunity 
was based on a subjective standard. Officials were immune unless they acted with 
malicious intent to injure the plaintiff or acted with knowledge or reason to know 
that their actions violated constitutional rights. See supra note 28. 
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B. Imbler v. Patchman 
The Supreme Court first addressed the immunity of state 
prosecutors from 5 1983 violations in Imbler v. P a t ~ h m a n . ~ ~  
Patchman, a California state prosecutor, was charged by 
Imbler with using false testimony and suppressing material 
evidence at  Imbler's trial.33 Imbler sought damages under 42 
U.S.C. $ 1983 for loss of liberty allegedly caused by the unlaw- 
ful p rose~ut ion .~~ The Court in Imbler granted the prosecutor 
absolute immunity from liability for his actions in initiating a 
prosecution and in presenting the state's case.35 
The Court in Imbler appeared to rely on a "well settled" 
common-law rule of immunitf6 and on general policy argu- 
32. 424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976) ("This case marks our first opportunity to ad- 
dress the $ 1983 liability of a state prosecuting officer."). 
33. Interestingly, it had been Patchman who had brought these matters to 
light. After Imbler's conviction, Patchman wrote to the Governor of California de- 
scribing the evidence that he and an investigator had discovered after trial. 
Patchman stated that he wrote from a belief that "a prosecuting attorney has a 
duty to be fair and see that all true facts, whether helphl to the case or not, 
should be presented." Id. at  413. It seems Patchman was an honorable prosecuting 
attorney; otherwise, he never would have brought forth potentially damaging mate- 
rial. In fact, Imbler's counsel in his brief for Imbler's state habeas corpus petition 
described Patchman's post-trial detective work as "[iln the highest tradition of law 
enforcement and justice." Id. at 420. 
I t  is worth noting that the Supreme Court's first ruling on prosecutorial immu- 
nity as it relates to $ 1983 damage claims was based on these facts. Not surpris- 
ingly, the apparently "honorable" actions of the prosecutor in Imbler established 
absolute immunity-despite an insecure historical basis in the common law for 
absolute prosecutorial immunity. See infra note 36 and accompanying text (com- 
menting on the lack of common law precedent for absolute prosecutorial immunity). 
34. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 416. 
35. Id. at 431 ('We hold only that in initiating a prosecution and in present- 
ing the State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under 
$ 1983."). 
36. The Court's statement that "[tlhe common-law rule of immunity is thus 
well settled," Imbler, 424 U.S. at  424, is questionable. See Coleman, supra note 19 
(arguing that the common law in general was not well established). Additionally, a 
nineteenth century treatise on malicious prosecution, MARTIN L. NEWELL, MALI- 
CIOUS PROSECUTION, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND THE ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCESS 
(1892), contains an extensive discussion of the immunity of judges, which makes i t  
clear that they are immune even if they act maliciously, id. at  125, but it states 
that quasi-judicial officers, such as prosecutors, are no t  entitled to such immunity 
if they do not act honestly. Newel1 concluded that a quasi-judicial officer could not 
be liable "for the honest exercise of his judgment, however erroneous or misguided 
that judgment may be," but there was no provision for absolute immunity for a 
quasi-judicial officer who performed his duties dishonestly or maliciously. Id. a t  
166. 
The treatise provided that prosecutors were liable if there were malice and 
absence of probable cause, with no distinction made between public and private 
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ments. The common-law origin of absolute immunity for prose- 
cutors is que~tionable:~ but only after purporting to find a 
common-law basis did the Court examine the policy arguments 
for providing the same immunity in 5 1983 suits.3s The first 
policy argument was that  without absolute protection the 
threat of 5 1983 suits would undermine prosecutors' perfor- 
m a n ~ e . ~ '  Second, the Court worried about honest prosecutors 
being subject to suit4' The Court was also concerned about 
the consequences of granting only qualified immunity to 
 prosecutor^.^^ When Imbler was decided, qualified immunity 
had a subjective element.42 The Court questioned whether 
qualified immunity a t  the time of Imbler would provide the 
necessary protection to ensure that there was not an adverse 
effect on the criminal justice system.43 Finally, the Court con- 
prosecutors; the section on defendants contained no exemption for public prosecu- 
tors, id. at  367-68; and the defendant's status as a public prosecutor was not listed 
as a defense, id. at 430-49. The fwst American case to address prosecutorial immu- 
nity, and the case the Supreme Court relied on in Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421, was 
Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117 (1896). Griffith was a case decided well after the 
enactment of $ 1983. In Griffith, the Indiana court held the prosecutor was enti- 
tled to absolute immunity based on state constitutional grounds-not common law. 
The fact the Indiana court relied only on the state constitutional argument for 
granting immunity supports the position that there was no common law rule of 
immunity for prosecutors in 1871. See Filosa, supra note 4, at 979-81 (explaining 
that the Court's historical derivation of prosecutorial immunity was based on its 
own decisions and ignored the common-law origin of immunity); Comment, Liability 
of Judicial Officers Un&r Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 337 (1969) ("There is no 
adequate rationale . . . for altogether exempting judicial officers from liability un- 
der section 1983."). 
37. See supra note 36; see also Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 496-501 (1991) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the historical 
roots of prosecutorial immunity). 
38. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text; Burns, 500 U.S. at 498 
(stating "the presumed legislative intent not to eliminate traditional immunities is 
our only justification for limiting the categorical language of the statute"); see also 
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2616-17 (1993); Antoine v. Byers & An- 
derson, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2167, 2170-71 (1993) (illustrating that in § 1983 immunity 
analysis the Court must f m t  find a common law precedent). 
39. "[Tlhe prosecutor's office would suffer if he were constrai~ed in making 
every decision by the consequences in terms of his own potential liability in a suit 
for damages." Imbler, 424 U.S. at  424. 
40. Id. at 425. 
41. Id. at 426. 
42. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
43. "The veracity of witnesses in criminal cases frequently is subject to doubt 
before and after they testify . . . . If prosecutors were hampered in exercising their 
judgment as to the use of such witnesses by concern about resulting personal lia- 
bility, the triers of fact in criminal cases often would be denied relevant evidence." 
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 426. 
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cluded that the public had criminal and professional sanctions 
to control prosecutorial misc~nduct .~~ Based on policy and the 
Court's common-law analysis, absolute immunity was extended 
to prosecutors when their functions were "intimately associated 
with the judicial phase of the criminal process."45 
Before Imbler, lower courts had generally held that prose- 
cutors were absolutely immune from suit when their activities 
were within the scope of "prosecutorial duties."46 Imbler af- 
firmed the functional approach4? employed by the majority of 
circuits, rather than a "status" or "position" appr~ach.~' In 
affirming the functional approach, the Imbler decision left un- 
answered questions regarding investigative and administrative 
functions. The Supreme Court specifically noted that adminis- 
trative or investigative activities of a prosecutor might not be 
pr~tected.~' The Court stated it had no occasion to decide 
whether investigative o r  administrative acts by a prosecutor 
should be absolutely pr~tected.~' The Court noted: 
We recognize that the duties of the prosecutor in his role a s  
advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the initi- 
ation of a prosecution and actions apart from the court- 
room. . . . Preparation, both for the initiation of the criminal 
process and for a trial, may require the obtaining, reviewing, 
and evaluating of evidence. At some point, and with respect to 
some decisions, the prosecutor no doubt functions as an ad- 
44. Id. at 429. But see znfia note 100 and accompanying text (explaining that 
criminal and professional sanctions are not effective methods to control prosecutori- 
a1 misconduct). 
45. Imhler, 424 U.S. at 430. 
46. Id. at 420 & n.16 (discussing previous holdings and citing circuit court 
decisions). 
47. Buns u. Reed and other cases made it clear that Imbler is based on a 
functional analysis. See, e.g., Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2167, 
2170-72 (1993); Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 296 n.3 (1988); Forrester v. White, 
484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1986); Mitchell v. 
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 520-23 (1985); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983); 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). 
48. A status or positional approach would have provided immunity to prosecu- 
tors solely because they are prosecutors. See Hurlburt v. Graham, 323 F.2d 723, 
725 (6th Cir. 1963) (the prosecutor was not liable in a civil suit based on the prin- 
ciple of "judicial immunity" without examining the actual function performed). 
49. "The purpose of the Court of Appeal's focus upon the functional nature of 
the activities rather than respondent's status was to distinguish and leave standing 
those cases . . . which hold that a prosecutor engaged in certain investigative ac- 
tivities enjoys, not the absolute immunity associated with the judicial process, but 
only a good-faith defense comparable to the policeman's." Imbler, 424 U.S. a t  430. 
50. Id. at 430-31. 
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ministrator rather than as an officer of the court. Drawing a 
proper line between these functions may present difficult 
questions, but this case does not require us to anticipate 
them.51 
As it pertains to prosecutorial immunity, the Supreme Court in  
Imbler acknowledged the difficulty in applying the functional 
approach in investigative and administrative contexts, but 
provided little guidance.52 
C. Burns v. Reed 
Fifteen years after Imbler, the Court in Burns v. ~ e e d ~ ~  
again addressed the issue of absolute prosecutorial immunity. 
The case focused on (1) prosecutorial immunity for giving legal 
advice to police officers about the legality of their investigative 
conduct and (2) prosecutorial immunity in probable cause hear- 
i n g ~ . ~ *  Applying the functional analysis set forth in Imbler, 
the Court in Burns held that a prosecutor is absolutely immune 
from civil liability while participating in a probable cause hear- 
but not when giving legal advice to the police. The deci- 
sion in Burns made clear that absolute immunity should not be 
granted for all prosecutorial functions. 
The Supreme Court in Burns found that there was no 
common law support for providing absolute immunity to a 
51. Id. at 431 n.33. 
52. The Court did intimate that the policy reasons set forth in Imbler could 
be used in applying the functional approach to prosecutors' investigative and ad- 
ministrative actions. See id. at  430-31 (the Court was not considering "whether like 
or similar [policy] reasons require immunity for those aspects of the prosecutor's 
responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer 
rather than that of advocate"). 
53. 500 U.S. 478 (1991). 
54. In Burns, two Indiana police officers sought legal advice regarding the 
propriety of hypnotizing a murder suspect whom they thought had multiple person- 
alities. A state prosecutor told the officers that they could proceed with the hypno- 
sis. Based on information obtained while the suspect was under hypnosis, the pros- 
ecutor advised the officers they probably had probable cause for arrest. The 
prosecutor and officer then presented the information obtained through hypnosis a t  
a probable cause hearing. Neither the officer nor the prosecutor informed the judge 
that the "confession" was obtained under hypnosis. Id. at 481-83. 
55. The Court noted that Burns challenged only the prosecutor's "participation 
in the hearing, and not his motivation in seeking the search warrant or his con- 
duct outside the courtroom relating to the warrant." Id. at  478. The Court deter- 
mined that the prosecutor was functioning in a role similar to a witness and there 
existed a common-law immunity for such functions. Additionally, the court conclud- 
ed that absolute immunity for a prosecutor's actions in a probable cause hearing is 
justified by the policy concerns of Imbler. Id. at  489-91. 
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prosecutor giving legal advice to police officers. The Court held 
that giving advice was not so "intimately associated with the 
judicial phase of the criminal process that it qualifies for abso- 
lute i m m ~ n i t ~ . " ~ ~ d d i t i o n a l l ~ ,  the Court recognized that 
qualified immunity had evolved since Imbler to protect "all but 
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the 
law.'"7 The Court recognized that the new qualified immunity 
standard was more protective and pragmatic,58 thus satisfying 
concerns that underlay the Court's recognition of absolute im- 
munity in I m b l e ~ ~ '  In sum, the Court reasoned that i t  would 
be ccincongruous to allow prosecutors to be absolutely immune 
from liability for giving advice to  the police, but t o  allow police 
officers only qualified immunity for following the advice."60 
The Court in Burns highlighted a prosecutorial function for 
which absolute immunity would not apply,6' but the Court 
provided little guidance regarding other prosecutorial functions. 
The Court in Imbler had broadly suggested that a prosecutor 
performing investigative or administrative functions might not 
be absolutely immune from suit under 5 1983 but gave little 
specific guidance regarding how such functions should be iden- 
tified?' In Burns, the Court analyzed the modified policy as- 
pects of Imbler and determined that giving advice to  police 
would not be absolutely protected. The Court did not, however, 
clarify the issue of how to determine when a prosecutor is func- 
tioning in an investigative or administrative role and when the 
prosecutor is functioning in an absolutely protected capacity. 
Rather, in Burns, the Supreme Court held only that giving 
legal advice to police officers was not an absolutely protected 
prosecutorial function. 
56. Id. at 493 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430). 
57. Buns ,  500 U.S. at 495 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 
(1985)). 
58. The standard is pragmatic because it  employs an objective standard that 
allows for determinations without a hearing. See Malley, 475 U.S. at 341 (discuss- 
ing the Harlow standard); see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 US .  511, 524 (1985) 
('Where an official could be expected to know that his conduct could violate statu- 
tory or constitutional rights, he should be made to hesitate . . . ."). 
59. Buns ,  500 U.S. at 494 n.8. 
60. Id. at 495. 
61. The decision prevented the grant of absolute immunity when a prosecutor 
gives legal advice. See Thomas M. Davy, Prosecutor Immunity: The Impact of 
Burns v. Reed, THE R-~OSECUTOR, Winter 1992 a t  21 (explaining ramifications of 
the Court's holding from a prosecutor's perspective). 
62. In ImEler, the extent of the Court's guidance is found in footnote 33 and 
the accompanying text. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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The majority decision in Buckley u. Fitzsimrnons provides 
guidance to courts and prosecutors. The Buckley holding estab- 
lishes a workable standard to determine when prosecutors' 
actions are not "intimately associated" with the judicial process 
and therefore not protected by absolute immunity. 
A. The Facts 
Stephen Buckley brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 9 1983 
against DuPage County State's Attorney Michael Fitzsimmons 
and others. Buckley claimed that Fitzsimmons had fabricated 
evidence during the preliminary investigation of the rape and 
murder of an eleven-year-old child.63 Buckley claimed that in 
order to obtain an indictment in a case that had engendered 
extensive publicity and intense emotions in the community, 
Fitzsimmons, in connection with an "expert witness," Louise 
rob bin^,^^ had fabricated evidence related to a boot print on 
the door of the victim's home." Additionally, Buckley sought 
damages for Fitzsimmons' allegedly false statements at a press 
conference announcing an indictment against him? Buckley 
claimed that in order to gain votes twelve days before a prima- 
ry election, Fitzsimmons made false statements about him in a 
press conference announcing his arresteG7 
Fitzsimmons convened a special grand jury for the sole 
purpose of investigating the case. After an eight-month inves- 
tigation, Fitzsimmons still was unable to provide enough evi- 
dence to warrant an indictment? Although no additional evi- 
63. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S .  ct .  2606, 2609-10 (1993). 
64. Louise Robbins was an anthropologist from North Carolina. Robbins alleg- 
edly was well known for her willingness to fabricate unreliable expert testimony. 
Id. at 2610. 
65. The boot print apparently had been left by the killer when he kicked in 
the door. After three separate lab studies failed to make a reliable connection 
between the bootprint at the murder site and Buckley's boots, prosecutors obtained 
a positive identification from Louise Robbins. Robbins' opinion was obtained during 
the early stages of the investigation, which was conducted under the joint supervi- 
sion and direction of the sheriff and prosecutors. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. ("[Fitzsimmons'] misconduct created a 'highly prejudicial and inflamed 
atmosphere' that seriously impaired the fairness of the judicial proceedings against 
an i ~ o c e n t  man and caused him to suffer a serious loss of freedom, mental an- 
guish, and humiliation."). 
68. At this time, Fitzsimmons admitted in a public statement that there was 
insufficient evidence to indict anyone for the rape and murder of the child. Id. 
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dence was obtained in the interim, an indictment against 
Buckley was issued two months later. I t  was a t  this time 
Fitzsimmons held the allegedly defamatory press conference 
twelve days before the election. Buckley was arrested and be- 
cause he was not able to meet the bond set a t  $3 million he 
was held in jail until charges were eventually dr~pped.~'  
Buckley filed a 8 1983 suit against Fitzsimmons. 
Buckley's two claims against Fitzsimmons were treated 
differently by different courts. The district court held that 
Fitzsimmons was entitled to absolute immunity regarding 
Buckley's claim that he fabricated evidence, but not for state- 
ments made at the press conference. However, the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Fitzsimmons had absolute 
immunity to both claims, applying an "~nprecedented"~~ inju- 
ry test.?' The Supreme Court granted Buckley's petition for 
certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for 
further proceedings in light of the Court's intervening decision 
in Burns v. Reed. On remand from the Supreme Court, the 
court of appeals found nothing in Bums to undermine its initial 
holding.72 The Supreme Court again granted certiorari and re- 
versed the court of appeals' decision, finding that absolute im- 
munity should not be granted for either claim. Because the 
Court was unanimous in denying absolute immunity for 
prosecutors' comments at a press ~onference,?~ the bulk of the 
Court's analysis dealt with the fabricated evidence claim. It 
69. Robbins provided the principal evidence against Buckley at trial, but the 
jury was unable to reach a verdict. When Robbins died before Buckley's retrial, all 
charges were dropped and he was released after three years in prison. Id. at 2611. 
70. Id. 
71. The basis of the test was that a prosecutor was entitled to absolute im- 
munity if the injury "flows from" the judicial process or if the injury is incomplete 
a t  the time the judicial process is initiated. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 919 F.2d 
1230, 1241 (7th Cir. 1990), ntodified, 952 F.2d 965 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. 
Ct. 53 (1992), reu'd, 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993). 
72. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 952 F.2d 965, 966-67 (7th Cir.), cert granted, 113 
S. Ct. 53 (1992), reu'd, 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993). 
73. In unanimously denying absolute immunity for comments made by a pros- 
ecutor at a press conference, the Court recognized that the circuits addressing the 
issue, other than the Seventh Circuit, had granted qualified immunity to press 
statements. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2618 n.9 (citing cases granting qualified immuni- 
ty for press statements); see also James Lappan, The Prosecutor, The Inuestigator, 
The Administrator, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Burns v. Reed: The Hammer Has 
Dropped, 62 MISS. L.J. 169, 183 11.91 (1992) (asserting that "prosecutorial state- 
ments made to the press concerning a criminal defendant have universally been 
held to command only qualified immunity"). 
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was the fabricated evidence claim that resulted in the "bright- 
line" probable cause standard and produced the divided 
The fabricated evidence claim is the focus of this 
Note. 
B. The Supreme Court's Analysis and Holding in Buckley 
In deciding Buckley, the Supreme Court followed estab- 
lished precedent. The Court first followed the traditional steps 
for a 5 1983 immunity analysis, concluding that prosecutors' 
actions are protected when they are closely associated with the 
judicial process.75 The Court then, emphasizing dicta in 
~ r n b l e r , ~ ~  reiterated that acts undertaken by a prosecutor in 
preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, 
and which occur during the prosecutor's role as an advocate for 
the state, are entitled to absolute immunity.77 The majority, 
however, found that in trying to determine whether Buckley 
had made the boot print, Fitzsimmons was acting not as an  
advocate, but rather as an investigator searching for clues and 
corroboration that might give probable cause for arrest.78 
The majority in Buckley determined that Fitzsimmons' 
actions were not intimately associated with the judicial process 
and were therefore only protected by qualified immunity. The 
majority reasoned that such activities, if performed by police 
officers and detectives, would only be entitled to qualified im- 
munity; therefore, the same immunity should apply to prosecu- 
tors performing the same actions.7g Additionally, the majority 
stated that convening a grand jury to consider whether evi- 
dence collected is sufficient to support an indictment does not 
74. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. 
75. The Court determined that certain immunities were so well established 
when $ 1983 was enacted that Courts should presume Congress would have spe- 
cifically so provided had it wished to abolish them. BuckZey, 113 S. Ct. at 2613. 
The court reiterated that most public officials are entitled only to qualified immu- 
nity. However, sometimes their actions fit within a common-law tradition of abso- 
lute immunity. Whether they do is determined by the nature of the function per- 
formed, not the identity of the actor who performed it. Id. For a prosecutor, abso- 
lute immunity is available for conduct that is "intimately associated with the judi- 
cial phase of the criminal process." Id. at  2614. 
76. Id. at  2614 (citing Imbler v. Patchman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 n.33 (1976)). 
77. Id. at 2615 ('We have not retreated, however, from the principle that acts 
undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or 
for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State, 
are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity."). 
78. Id. at 2616. 
79. See infia part 1V.C. 
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retroactively transform the efforts made to collect the evidence 
from administrative to prosecutorial actions.80 The Court con- 
cluded that "a prosecutor neither is, nor should consider him- 
self to be, an advocate before he has probable cause to have 
anyone arre~ted."~' The Court thus drew a line between prose- 
cutorial actions before and after probable cause exists, with a 
presumption of qualified immunity before and absolute immu- 
nity after there is probable cause. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY OPINION IN BUCKLEY 
The entire Court8%ecognized the need to provide a stan- 
dard for distinguishing between "advocacy" and "investigation," 
and the majority opinion did so. The majority opinion provides 
guidance to courts and prosecutors and is rational. The Buckley 
probable cause standard is appropriate because: (1) it does not 
undermine the protection found necessary in Imbler; (2) the 
conflicting duties of a prosecutor support the determination 
that a prosecutor is not an "advocate" until there is probable 
cause; (3) the probable cause standard promotes the equal 
treatment of prosecutors and police officers; and (4) the stan- 
dard is workable. The preceding statements supporting the 
Buckley probable cause standard will be individually examined. 
In analyzing aspects of the probable cause standard, arguments 
presented by the dissent will also be addressed. 
A. The Probable Cause Standard Does Not Undermine 
Protection Found Necessary in Imbler 
The probable cause standard fills gaps left by the Court in 
Imbler. The Court in Imbler never decided whether investiga- 
tive or administrative functions of a prosecutor should be abso- 
lutely protected.83 Although the Court in Burns determined 
that absolute immunity should not be granted for certain prose- 
cutorial acts (i.e., giving advice to police officers), it provided no 
80. "A prosecutor may not shield his investigative work with the aegis of 
absolute immunity merely because, after a suspect is eventually arrested, indicted, 
and tried, that work may be retroactively described as 'preparation' for a possible 
trial . . . ." Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2617. 
81. Id. at 2616. 
82. "In recognizing a distinction between advocacy and investigation . . . I 
understand the necessity for a workable standard in this area." Id. a t  2625 (Ken- 
nedy, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
83. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. 
PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY 
general guidance as to  which functions are investigative and 
which are adrnini~trative.~~ The probable cause standard in 
Buckley provides a method for determining which acts are 
protected without undermining protection found necessary in 
I m l ~ l e r . ~ ~  
The Buckley probable cause standard does not undermine 
necessary prosecutorial protection because the qualified im- 
munity standard has changed. The Court in Burns recognized 
that the qualified immunity standard was more protective and 
less burdensome to implement than it had been.86 Under the 
~ a r l o w ' ~  approach to granting qualified immunity, frivolous 
suits can be dismissed on a motion for summary judgement. 
Additionally, under the Malley standard all but the plainly in- 
competent are protected? Because the qualified immunity 
standard now provides more protection than at the time Inbler 
was decided,89 many of the Court's concerns expressed in the 
Imbler opinion no longer apply. 
The dissent argues that a prosecutor who is sued for mali- 
cious prosecution is no longer protected. The dissent claims 
that whether absolute immunity exists will be based on the 
plaintiff's manipulation of the complaint.90 The dissent's argu- 
ment is that a § 1983 plaintiff will merely assert that the pros- 
ecutor violated his rights before a finding of probable cause. By 
84. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
85. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text (explaining the policy argu- 
ments the Court addressed in Imbler). 
86. "But the qualified immunity standard is today more protective of officials 
than it was a t  the time that Imbler was decided." Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 
494 (1991). 
87. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 US.  800 (1982). See supra note 28 and accom- 
panying text (explaining the Harlow approach). 
88. Malley v. Briggs, 475 US.  335, 341 (1986). 
89. Judge McKay of the Tenth Circuit noted the following: 
Since Imbler, the Court has expanded the protection of qualified immunity 
by eliminating its benevolent intent requirement. . . . Thus, 1983 defen- 
dants who have qualified immunity are now less likely to be liable, and, 
if not liable, are less likely to have to go to trial since the objective qual- 
ified immunity standard lends itself to resolution on the pleadings. This 
decreases the disruption to state criminal law enforcement that would 
result from granting a prosecutor only qualified immunity. The Supreme 
Court has not yet suggested, however, that this dramatic change in 
Imbler's frame of reference affects Imbler's reach. 
Lerwill v. Joslin, 712 F.2d 435, 437 n.2 (10th Cir. 1983). 
90. "This formulation of absolute prosecutorial immunity would convert what 
is now a substantial degree of protection for prosecutors into little more than a 
pleading rule." Buckky, 113 S. Ct. a t  2621 ( K e ~ e d y ,  J., dissenting). 
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asserting that the misconduct occurred before probable cause 
existed, the prosecutor would not be entitled to absolute immu- 
nity. 
Although future plaintiffs may assert "pre-probable cause" 
violations in their complaints, the Buckley probable cause stan- 
dard remains appropriate. The function test, which the dissent 
clearly  support^,^' requires that prosecutors not acting in a 
capacity "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the 
criminal processBg2 should not be entitled to absolute immuni- 
ty for their actions.g3 Thus, a suit for malicious prosecution is 
absolutely protected if the contested actions of the prosecutor 
occur after a prosecutor has assumed a capacity "intimately 
associated" with the judicial phase of the proceedings. If prose- 
cutorial misconduct occurs before probable cause exists:4 the 
prosecutor is not "intimately associated" with the judicial phase 
of the criminal proceedings and is not protected by an absolute 
immunity. The majority decision in Buckley rightly held that 
until probable cause exists, a prosecutor is not an advocate, 
and therefore is not intimately functioning within the judicial 
phase of the criminal process.95 
91. Id. at 2620 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe Court is correct to observe, 
the rules determining whether particular actions of government officials are enti- 
tled to immunity have their origin in historical practice and have resulted in a 
functional approach."). 
92. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. 
93. The following hypothetical illustrates why the probable cause standard is 
not an avenue for "manipulating pleadings," but rather is a means for defining the 
functional test. In the proposed hypothetical, one group of prosecutors is involved 
in investigating a crime. Later, another group of prosecutors prosecute the case. In 
these circumstances, under the function test set forth in Imbler, the prosecuting 
attorneys would be absolutely immune from civil suit. These prosecutors would be 
absolutely protected from a claim of malicious prosecution, because they were clear- 
ly functioning in the "judicial phase of the criminal process." However, the investi- 
gating prosecutors were not performing functions "intimately associated with the 
judicial process." Under the function analysis, the functions they were performing 
are only protected by qualified immunity. Conceptually, the legal ramiFications of 
one group of prosecutors performing both functions should be the same. Prosecutors 
should be absolutely protected when prosecuting a case but not when investigating 
a case before a finding of probable cause. 
94. I t  is significant that the focus is on whether probable cause misted as 
opposed to a formal finding of probable cause. See infra notes 145-47 and accompa- 
nying text (discussing why the Buckley probable cause standard is best interpreted 
as not requiring a formal determination of probable cause). Despite the dissent's 
concerns, it is clear that if probable cause existed a plaintiff c a ~ o t  "manipulate" 
the complaint to show otherwise and, thus, the prosecutor is presumably protected 
by absolute immunity. See infia note 158 (discussing the presumption of absolute 
immunity after probable cause exists). 
95. See infra part N.B. (explaining prosecutors' multiple duties and why 
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B. The Conflicting Duties of a Prosecutor Support the De- 
termination That a Prosecutor Is Not an 'fAdvocate" Until 
There Is Probable Cause 
A prosecutor's duty is to "do justice," not merely to con- 
v i ~ t . ~ '  Although prosecutors have the duty to "do justice," they 
must also serve as aggressive  advocate^.^? To the detriment of 
criminal defendants and society, prosecutors ofteng8 pursue 
their role as "aggressive advocates" beyond proper bounds, 
ignoring their duty t o  do justice." Some method to curb prose- 
cutorial misconduct is needed aside from criminal and profes- 
sional  sanction^.'^^ A court ruling defining and limiting a 
before probable cause exists a prosecutor's duty does not weigh in favor of aggres- 
sively representing the public as  the state's advocate). 
96. The Supreme Court has stated: 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party 
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impar- 
tially is as  compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose inter- 
est, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, 
but that justice shall be done. 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFES- 
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. (1) (1994) (stating that "a prosecutor has the re- 
sponsibility of a minister of justice"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILI- 
TY EC 7-13 (1994) (providing that government lawyers must "seek justicen); cf. 
William C. Gourley, Note, Role of the Prosecutor: Fair Minister of Justice with 
Firm Convictions, 16 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 295, 298-302 (1982) (discussing 
Canadian prosecutor's minister of justice role). 
97. "To the extent that the adversary system works according to theory, gov- 
ernment lawyers promote justice by playing the same role at trial as  private advo- 
cates. . . . At one level, the prosecutor thus helps achieve the appropriate systemic 
results-does adversarial justice-simply by performing as an  aggressive advocate." 
Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prose- 
cutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 56 (1991). 
98. Commentators who have studied prosecutorial misconduct have recognized 
its frequency. See Albert Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and  Dia l  
Judges, 50 TEX. L. REV. 629, 631 (1972); Edward M. Genson and Mark W. Martin, 
The Epidemic of Prosecutorial Courtroom Misconduct in Illinois: Is it Time to Start 
Prosecuting the Prosecutors?, 19 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 39 (1987); Bennett L. Gershman, 
The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 455 (1992) (discussing prosecutors' 
dual role as  both "an aggressive advocate seeking convictions and a quasi-judicial 
official seeking justice"); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecu- 
tors for "Brady" Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693 (1987); Walter W. 
Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline, 38 SW. L.J. 965, 979 
(1984) ("review[ing] some reasons for the failure of our present institutions to stop 
trial misconduct by prosecutors"). 
99. Zacharias provides reasons for such results. "For elected prosecutors, pub- 
licity about trial successes is essential to campaigns. For subordinate prosecutors in 
larger offices, promotion and internal evaluation depends largely on the ability to 
produce convictions." Zacharias, supra note 97, a t  58 n.63. 
100. Justice Urbigkit explains why criminal and professional sanctions are in- 
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prosecutor's absolutely protected role as an advocate makes 
prosecutors more apt to "do justice." The Buckley probable 
cause standard so defines and regulates a prosecutor's ad- 
versarial role. 
Before probable cause exists, a prosecutor should not be 
considered an "advocate" in the absolutely protected sense.lO' 
She has not assumed an adversarial role toward the defendant. 
A prosecutor, unlike most advocates, is not retained to repre- 
sent one party. Prosecutors represent many groups and the 
emphasis of a prosecutor's duty in representing the groups 
varies. Prosecutors represent the police, the victim, the defen- 
dant, those who care about the victim and defendant, and citi- 
zens as a whole.lo2 The dissenting justices' concern in Buckley 
that a prosecutor not protected by absolute immunity will not 
have "full fidelity"103 to the prosecutorial role, is misplaced. 
Contrary to  what the dissenting justices imply in their opinion, 
prosecutors must be concerned about more than faithfully pur- 
suing a conviction. lo4 
Justice Kennedy's statement in the dissent, "I do not un- 
derstand the art of advocacy to have an inherent temporal 
adequate; he contends: 
[Allternative remedies providing responsibility to the immunized public 
official for his bad conduct in order to avoid the chilling result of mone- 
tary responsibility would substitute either criminal prosecution or profes- 
sional sanction as the punishment . . . . [Iln the justice delivery system, 
these alternatives are seldom if ever actually applied. It is an unaccept- 
able fraud on the public since prosecutors seldom prosecute prosecutors 
and bar associations infrequently take punitive action to correct prosecuto- 
rial suborned perjury. 
Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d 1287, 1309 (Wyo. 1990), cert. granted and judg- 
ment vacated by 501 U.S. 1201 (1991). 
101. Two terms are used to refer to prosecutorial functions protected by ab- 
solute immunity. Functions "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the 
criminal process" and functions performed by prosecutors in their role as an "advo- 
cate." Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31. These terms are interrelated and both represent 
circumstances when a prosecutor will be absolutely immune from civil suit. 
102. See Carol A. Corrigan, On Prosecutorial Ethics, 13 H A ~ I N G S  CONST. L.Q. 
537, 538-39 (1986) (the prosecutor speaks for "all" the people). 
103. "The prospect of liability may 'inductel [ a  prosecutor] to act with an ex- 
cess of caution or otherwise to skew [his] decisions in ways that result in less 
than full fidelity to the objective and independent criteria that ought to guide [his] 
conduct.'" Buclzley, 113 S .  Ct. at 2622 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Forrester 
v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988)). 
104. See infia notes 116-120 and accompanying text (describing the undesirable 
results and circumstances that society and prosecutors must face when prosecu- 
torial "fidelity" is interpreted as solely obtaining convictions). 
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l imi ta t i~n ," '~~  is incompatible with a prosector's role before 
probable cause exists. Before probable cause to arrest, a 
prosecutor is not an advocate in  the judicial sense. Before prob- 
able cause, a prosecutor's duty weighs more heavily in favor of 
protecting the rights of society and of those who might be ar- 
rested. Once there is probable cause to arrest someone, the bal- 
ance shifts, and the prosecutor assumes a more aggressive, 
adversarial role.lO"nce probable cause exists, prosecutorial 
duties weigh in favor of aggressively representing the 
community's interest in a just convi~tion. '~~ 
The probable cause standard recognizes the different du- 
ties of prosecutors. By holding that a prosecutor is not abso- 
lutely protected from civil suit before probable cause exists, the 
majority in Buckley implicitly recognizes the varied groups 
prosecutors represent and the need to balance the prosecutor's 
duty in representing them. By balancing the prosecutor's duties 
to potential defendants before a probable cause determination, 
and her duty to the community to provide a just conviction 
after probable cause exists, the majority's probable cause stan- 
dard benefits society. 
C. Before Probable Cause For Arrest a Prosecutor Is Func- 
tioning as a Police Officer 
A goal of 5 1983 immunity jurisprudence is to ensure equal 
treatment among state actors engaged in identical func- 
tions.lo8 Generally, police officers do investigative work. Be- 
fore probable cause exists, a prosecutor's functions are similar 
to those of police officers. Because both function in similar 
roles, both should be granted the same degree of immunity.log 
105. Buckley, 113 S .  Ct. a t  2624. 
106. Even grand jury proceedings, which are usually used to determine if prob- 
able cause exists, are nonadversarial in  nature. See DAVID M. NISSMAN & ED 
HAGEN, THE PROSECUTION RJNCTION 18 (1982); cf. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 
489 (1991) (concluding that a prosecutor's participation in a probable cause hearing 
is absolutely protected not because a prosecutor is acting as  an advocate, but be- 
cause his role is similar to a witness's role, which was protected a t  common law). 
107. Cf Zacharias, supra note 97, a t  56-60 (explaining how prosecutors fit into 
the adversarial system). 
108. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226, 229 (1988); Cleavinger v. 
Saxner, 474 U.S. 199, 201 (1985) (holding that functions of state actors, not their 
status, must be the focus of an immunity analysis). 
109. Both should be entitled to qualified immunity. In Robichaud v. Ronan, 
351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965) the Ninth Circuit in a pre-Imbler decision stated, 
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The majority in Buckley stated: 'When a prosecutor performs 
the investigative functions normally performed by a detective 
or police officer, it is 'neither appropriate nor justifiable that, 
for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not the 
~ther.'""~ The Buckley holding is fair in that it treats police 
and prosecutors functioning in the same role equally. 
The dissenting justices argue that the functions of police 
officers and prosecutors before a finding of probable cause are 
not the same. The dissent asserts that a prosecutor can be 
examining the evidence for trial purposes while a police officer 
examines the evidence to decide whether it provides a basis for 
arresting a suspect."' The difficulty with the dissent's asser- 
tion is in deciding whether the prosecutor in a particular in- 
stance was examining the evidence for trial purposes or t o  
establish probable cause. If the prosecutor was investigating 
evidence to find probable cause, she was functioning similarly 
t o  a police investigator. If she was examining evidence "to de- 
termine whether it will be persuasive at trial and of assistance 
t o  the trier of fact,""?hen she was engaged in a prosecutori- 
a1 function. The problem is making this determinati~n."~ 
Deciding what the prosecutor was really thinking would re- 
quire a subjective analysis, which, due to its difficulty in imple- 
menting,"' should be avoided.' l5 
We believe, however, that when a prosecuting attorney acts in some ca- 
pacity other than his quasi-judicial capacity, then the reason for his im- 
munity-integral relationship between his acts and the judicial pro- 
cess--ceases to exist. If he acts in the role of a policeman, then why 
should he not be liable, as is the policeman, if, in so acting, he has de- 
prived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Federal Constitution and laws. . . ..To us, it seems neither appropriate 
nor justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one 
and not the other. 
Id. a t  536-37; see also Higgs v. District Court, 713 P.2d 840, 853-57 (Colo. 1985) 
(prosecutors' drafting of documents and affidavits used to secure warrants for 
nontestimonial evidence and photo identification procedures more closely resembled 
police conduct than advocacy). 
110. Bucklq, 113 S. Ct. at  2616 (quoting Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 
608 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974)). 
111. Id. at 2624 ( K e ~ e d y ,  J., dissenting) ('Two actors can take part in similar 
inquiries while doing so for different reasons and to advance different functions."). 
112. Id. 
113. Conceivably, the dissent would conclude that a prosecutor only investi- 
gates a crime and examines evidence "to determine whether i t  will be persuasive 
a t  trial." Id. Such a conclusion is unsupported by reality. Any prosecutor investi- 
gating a crime and examining evidence realizes that no matter how "persuasive" a 
finding may be, it is of little value unless there is somebody to accuse and try. 
114. The present case illustrates the difficulty in applying a subjective, 
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Aside from the pragmatic reasons, there are policy reasons 
why prosecutors should not be considered absolutely protected 
advocates during a pre-indictment investigation.ll6 A poten- 
tial defendant117 does not want a prosecutor to evaluate the 
evidence as a judicial advocate for the state. A prosecutor who 
examines evidence with a focus on a possible trial or suspect 
may find evidence with considerable "jury appeal." This can 
lead to the problem of wanting to use evidence to con~ict"~ 
solely because there exists evidence to con~ict."~ Unfortu- 
nately, if such evidence exists, it might be tempting for a prose- 
cutor to act improperly t o  indict someone, whether that "some- 
one" should be indicted or not?' Such a problem is an  unde- 
sirable result that society faces when prosecutors focus solely 
on their duty to pursue convictions. 
By recognizing that prosecutors should receive the same 
degree of immunity as police officers, the probable cause 
standard: (1) promotes fairness among public officers, (2 )  avoids 
a difficult-to-implement, subjective analysis, and (3) benefits 
"prosecutor's thoughts" test. If the test were applied to the examination of the boot 
print, a trial court would be forced to determine whether the prosecutor examined 
the boot print to determine whether it would be persuasive a t  trial or whether the 
prosecutor's examination was meant to establish probable cause. To make such a 
determination, the court would have to determine the prosecutor's thoughts at the 
time of the examination. This determination would be difficult, if not impossible, 
and completely subjective. 
115. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-16 (1982) (examining the 
problems of a subjective test as it relates to absolute or qualified immunity). 
116. The dissent argues it will discourage early participation of prosecutors. To 
the extent that discouraging early participation is harmful, see infra notes 117-120 
and accompanying text (explaining why it might not be harmful), the question 
should be asked to what degree will early participation be discouraged. I t  may only 
discourage improper early participation. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 
(1985) (stating that qualified immunity protects all except the incompetent or those 
acting maliciously). Additionally, police do not enjoy absolute protection for their 
actions, yet they 'perform necessary investigative functions. The same should be 
true for prosecutors. 
117. "Potential defendant" as used in this Note refers to anyone who could be 
linked to the crime whether remotely connected to the actual wrongdoing or not. 
118. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (stating the factors that could 
motivate a prosecutor to seek convictions). 
119. See, e.g., Comer v. City of Philadelphia, 49 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 1313 (D. 
Pa. 1991) (illustrating how a prosecutor might engage in improper conduct to link 
a potential defendant to a crime). 
120. The Buckley decision can help curb this overly aggressive conduct. No lon- 
ger will a prosecutor's investigative actions be above civil reproach. The prosecutor 
will be held to the same standard as the other state officers with whom she is 
working. 
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society by curbing the temptation to "create a defendant" solely 
because there is evidence to sustain a conviction. 
D. The Probable Cause Standard Is Rational and Functional 
The probable cause standard is rational and functional for 
three reasons. First, the probable cause standard recognizes 
the rights of the wrongfully injured and yet sufficiently protects 
prosecutors. Second, prosecutors can function without being 
hesitant about aggressively prosecuting. Third, the standard is 
based on an objective and distinguishable determination. 
1. Rights of the wrongfilly injured are balanced against pro- 
tecting prosecutors from civil suit 
Great injury can occur when an individual is criminally 
prosecuted.'" Because no criminal justice system is perfect, 
mistakes will occur and innocent citizens will occasionally be 
prosecuted and ~0nvicted.l~~ Failure to compensate these per- 
sons, especially those who are convicted and later exonerated, 
may seem abhorrently unjust. Although terribly unfair, injury 
without compensation is generally accepted as a "necessary 
evil" of the United States criminal justice system.'23 However, 
121. Justice White previously stated, "Arrest is a public act that may seriously 
interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that 
may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, 
subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his 
friends." United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971). 
122. "A wrongful conviction results when, for a variety of reasons ranging from 
perjured testimony to negligent investigation, an individual who is factually inno- 
cent of a criminal charge is found guilty in a court of law and ordered incarcerat- 
ed in a penal institution." James Cleary, When the Prisoner Is Innocent, 14 HUM. 
RTS. 42, 44 (1987); see, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages 
of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987) (cataloging the 
cases of 350 persons nationwide who since 1900 were convicted of "potentially 
capital" offenses but later found to be innocent because no crime occurred or the 
defendant was legally and physically uninvolved in the crime); Marty I. 
Rosenbaum, Inevitable Error: Wrongful New York State Homicide Convictions, 1965- 
1988, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 807 (1991-92) (documenting "mistakes" in 
the New York criminal justice system related to capital crimes). 
123. Professor James Cleary states that approximately ten states provide some 
compensation through statutes for wrongfully convicted citizens. However, Cleary 
points out that "several prerequisites are normally necessary," such as  receiving a 
full pardon by the chief executive of that jurisdiction. Additionally, Cleary docu- 
ments some of the monetary limitations the state statutes impose. In sum, few 
states provide legislation to compensate the wrongfully convicted, and those states 
that do allow compensation have legislation imposing very restrictive caps on the 
amount to be granted. See Cleary supra note 122, at 44-45. 
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when the injury arising from an arrest and prosecution is  
caused maliciously,l" not by mistake,125 just restitution 
should ensue. 12" 
In a perfect system, when one is maliciously injured within 
the criminal justice system, injuries would be c~mpensated. '~~ 
Unfortunately, the current judicial system could not accommo- 
date the voluminous litigation and enormous costs that would 
ensue if all state actors in the criminal justice system were 
subject to civil action. Although arguably unjust, basic eco- 
124. See, e.g., Gershman supra note 98, at 451-53 (documenting case by case 
the conviction and punishment of innocent persons based on prosecutorial miscon- 
duct). 
125. I t  is easy to agree that no personal liability should lie for innocent 
errors in judgment, nor is there any indication in the cases that judg- 
es [or prosecuting attorneys] ever have been subject to liability for 
this type of injury. By definition, the world over, judges [or prosecut- 
ing attorneys], acting within their jurisdiction, are allowed an honest 
mistake. But the explanation of immunity for corrupt acts is a dis- 
tinct and different matter, hanging by an ancient thread that is as  
out of place in the cloth of modern democracy as the theory of sover- 
eign immunity of government has recently been discovered to be. 
R. J. Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CAL. L. REV. 303, 310-11 (1959). 
126. Perhaps the only meaningful substitute for compensation would be the 
application of Hammurabi's Code, 1792 to 1750 R.C. where [the prose- 
cuting attorneys] would spend [the same amount of time as the in- 
jured citizen] in . . . jail as prisoners without access to a court and 
while their families, if any, wait without funds or home for some 
other bureaucratic majordomo to end the incarceration. 
Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d 1287, 1302 n.4 (Wyo. 1990) (Urbigkit, J., dissent- 
ing), cert. granted and judgment vacated by, 501 U.S. 1201 (1991). 
127. The criminal justice system is, as with all human institutions, fallible. 
To turn a deaf ear to claims of wrongfully convicted persons would be 
a classic example of hypocrisy and indifference. . . . It would seem in- 
cumbent though in a democratic society to more fully address and 
make available appropriate compensation for wrongful convictions. 
Cleary, supra note 122, at 45; see also Cooney v. White, 845 P.2d 353, 366 (Wyo. 
1992) (stating "[dlamages paid for damages done is singularly more satisfying to 
the party injured"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 60 (1993). 
128. As the number of claims against government officials increased during 
the 1960's and 19707s, concern mounted among both judges and com- 
mentators that the rising volume of litigation would outstrip the 
courts' management capabilities and would hamper effective govern- 
ment. The United States Supreme Court in a series of decisions in 
the 1970's and early 1980's designed limits on civil rights actions in 
response to these concerns. 
Edmund L. Carey, Jr., Note, Quick Termination of Insubstantial Civil Rights 
Claims: Qualified Immunity and Procedural Fairness, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1543, 1544- 
46 (1985). 
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388 (19711, Justice Black in his dissenting opinion stated, 
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nomic principles provide strong support for $ 1983 immuni- 
ties? Additionally, it  is argued that some state actors need 
absolute immunity to properly perform their traditional judicial 
functions. 130 Although acting in a quasi-judicial role,131 
prosecutors have been protected in a manner similar to judg- 
es.lS2 The Buckley probable cause standard supports a bal- 
ance between injured citizens' rights and the need to protect 
prosecutors from civil suit and the criminal justice system from 
presently insurmountable financial realities. 
Although the Supreme Court began the process in 
Burns,133 the Buckley decision clearly held that wrongfully in- 
jured criminal defendants are not always prohibited from re- 
ceiving restitution from a prosecuting attorney. Although it is a 
small step towards fully compensating wrongly prosecuted 
citizens, the Buckley decision does help level the balance be- 
tween protecting prosecutors and compensating victims. 
The Buckley probable cause standard allows some avenue 
of relief for wrongfully prosecuted citizens yet maintains suffi- 
cient protection for prosecutors. Prosecutors are still cloaked 
My fellow Justices on this Court and our brethren throughout the federal 
judiciary know only too well the time-consuming task of conscientiously 
poring over hundreds of thousands of pages of factual allegations of mis- 
conduct by police, judicial, and corrections officials. Of course, there are 
instances of legitimate grievances . . . . 
[However, w]e sit a t  the top of a judicial system accused by some 
of nearing the point of collapse. 
Id. at 428-29. Judicial resources have not increased since 1971; rather, they are 
stretched even tighter now. See Malcom M. Lucas, Is Inadequate Funding Threaten- 
ing Our System of Justice?, 74 JUDICATURE 292 (1990-91). 
129. See Lucas, supra note 128, a t  292 (describing the adverse effects of lim- 
ited resources on the judicial system). But see Christina Whitman, Constitutional 
Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 28 (1980) (stating "caseload considerations are necessari- 
ly secondary to the vindication of those [constitutional] rights"). 
130. "Judges, witnesses, and jurors have long been afforded absolute immunity 
for acts performed within the scope of their official capacities. This protection was 
originally justified by the need to protect the exercise of their judgment free from 
the threat of vexatious suits by dissatisfied litigants." Coyne, supra note 7, a t  
1112. 
131. Justice Scalia described "quasi-judicial" acts as "official acts involving 
policy discretion but not consisting of adjudication." Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 
500 (1991). 
132. See Coyne, supra note 7, a t  1112-13. But see Buns  500 U.S. a t  500 
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that quasi- 
judicial officers were entitled only to qualified immunity a t  common law). 
133. See supra note 61  and accompanying text (explaining that the Supreme 
Court in Buns recognized an incident where a prosecutor was not absolutely pro- 
tected from suit). 
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with absolute immunity for actions performed in their ad- 
versarial role. The Buckley probable cause standard provides a 
means for determining when the adversarial role begins? 
Additionally, functions performed in a nonadversarial role are 
still protected by qualified immunity.135 
2. Prosecutors can function without being hesitant about ag- 
gressively performing their duties 
A prosecutor does not need absolute immunity for all ac- 
tions to assure an aggressive p rosec~t ion . '~~  In discussing the 
"need" to absolutely protect prosecutors so they will "not shirk 
from fearless advocacy," Justice Urbigkit of the Wyoming Su- 
preme Court concluded, 
This supposition of provided right to be irresponsible in order 
to do the job for which the ofice is held demeans the office- 
holder and insults the lawyer who holds it. . . . If a level of 
economic responsibility is required for the conduct of the 
practicing lawyer and the committed physician, one then 
wonders why not for the public official of either or both pro- 
fessions. Each time that kind of comment is written into opin- 
ion, the inquiry is academically raised whether the writer 
would perform his responsibilities only if also free from re- 
sponsiveness for violations of the constitutional rights of an- 
other person with wilfulness or malice.13? 
Although the Buckley probable cause standard does not wholly 
require prosecutors to be economically responsible, i t  is a step 
134. Undoubtedly, there will be circumstances after probable cause exists 
where a prosecutor's functions are nonadversarial and not intimately associated 
with the judicial phase of the criminal proceedings. In these circumstances, based 
on the function performed, a prosecutor should not be absolutely protected. Howev- 
er, after probable cause exists a presumption should exist that the prosecutor's ac- 
tivities are adversarial in nature and closely linked to the judicial phase of the 
criminal proceedings. See infra note 161 (providing an example after probable cause 
exists where a prosecutor's functions are nonadversarial). 
135. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (explaining the increased 
protection that qualified immunity now provides). 
136. Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d 1287, 1302 n.4 (Wyo. 1990) (explaining 
that all other attorneys are "painfully" subject to Rule 11 assessments), cert. grant- 
ed and judgment vacated by, 501 U.S. 1201 (1991). But see Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 
F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) ("Better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by 
dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant 
dread of retaliation."), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950). 
137. Cooney, 792 P.2d at  1350 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting). 
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in  recognizing that prosecutors can perform their duties with- 
out absolute protection. 
The Buckley probable cause standard does not go so far as 
to completely remove absolute immunity in all situations. The 
Buckley decision only replaces absolute immunity with quali- 
fied immunity in those cases where a prosecutor acted improp- 
erly before a finding of probable cause. After a finding of proba- 
ble cause, a prosecutor's role as the state advocate generally 
provides her with absolute immunity.ls8 
The Buckley probable cause standard protects the inves- 
tigative operation and the adversarial operation of a state pros- 
ecution with a standard necessary to assure that both function 
efficiently. 13' Historically, police have performed investigative 
functions while protected from civil suit by qualified immunity. 
If qualified immunity provides sufficient protection for the 
investigative functions of police officers, qualified immunity 
also is sufficient protection for prosecutors before a finding of 
probable cause. Before a finding of probable cause, the prosecu- 
tor is not functioning in an adversarial role because there is no 
one a prosecutor could rightfully pro~ecute . '~~  Rather, a pros- 
ecutor is functioning in a role similar to that of a police offi- 
cer.141 Prosecutors can aggressively function in their investi- 
gative role under qualified immunity just as police officers. 
Investigations by prosecutors can be pursued with the qualified 
protection afforded police while a prosecutor's adversarial role 
connected t o  the judicial proceedings will be absolutely protect- 
ed. 
3. The Buckley probable cause standard is functional because 
it is based on a.n objective determination 
A n  important element of the Buckley probable cause stan- 
dard is that the line between qualified protection and absolute 
protection is objectively determinable. The key question is 
whether probable cause existed a t  the time of the prosecutor's 
alleged misconduct. If probable cause existed, the prosecutor is 
138. See infra note 158 and accompanying text (explaining that a presumption 
of absolute immunity arises after probable cause exists). 
139. Cooney, 792 P.2d at  1302 ("The proper office of immunity should be con- 
strained to protect governmental operation."). 
140. See supra part 1V.B. (explaining the need to balance a prosecutor's mul- 
tiple duties). 
141. See supra part 1V.C. 
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presumed to be acting in an adversarial role.142 Once a prose- 
cutor assumes an adversarial role, she should be entitled to 
absolute immunity.143 Significantly, i n  Anderson u .  
Creighton,'" the Supreme Court reasoned that a determina- 
tion of probable cause was an "objective, albeit fact specific, 
q~est ion." '~~ The decision in Anderson facilitates the Buckley 
probable cause standard. 
A court can objectively determine whether probable cause 
existed at  the time of the alleged prosecutorial wrongdoing. It 
should be noted that the Buckley dissent's concern about pre- 
mature indictments and arrests146 is somewhat misplaced. 
The majority opinion neither states nor implies that a third 
party determination of probable cause is necessary to provide 
absolute protection to prosecutors. Conversely, the majority 
opinion states, "the prosecutors do not contend that they had 
probable cause."147 Contrary to the dissent's claim, this state- 
ment indicates that a formal determination of probable cause is 
not necessary. If probable cause existed at  the time of the pros- 
ecutorial wrongdoing, despite whether there was a formal in- 
dictment or arrest, the prosecutor would be acting in an ad- 
versarial r01e.l~~ As stated previously, the adversarial role of 
a prosecutor is the central element in the grant of absolute im- 
munity. 14' 
The Buckley probable cause standard is preferable to the 
dissent's self-defined "drawing of difficult and subtle distinc- 
tions" test.lsO The dissent's proposed standard would entail 
determining what the prosecutor was thinking during her in- 
142. See infia note 158 and accompanying text. 
143. See Rex v. Teeples, 753 F.2d 840, 843 (10th Cir.) ("Although identlfylng 
those acts entitled to absolute immunity is not always easy, the determinative 
factor is 'advocacy' because that is the prosecutor's main function and the one most 
akin to his quasi-judicial role."), cwt.  denied, 474 U.S. 967 (1985). 
144. 483 U.S. 635 (1987). 
145. Id. at 641. 
146. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2623 (1993). 
147. Id. at 2616. 
148. To the extent prosecutors want to be sure that probable cause exists, they 
will initiate formal proceedings. This could support the dissent's concern about 
premature pretrial indictments and arrests. However, the majority opinion should 
not be read as requiring such a determination. See id. (implying that, whether or 
not a formal determination is rendered, if probable cause exists, a prosecutor's 
actions are linked to the judicial phase of the criminal proceeding and are there- 
fore protected). 
149. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
150. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. a t  2625 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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vestigation.15' In each case, the dissent would have courts de- 
termining whether prosecutorial actions were investigative or 
done in preparation for tria1.15' This determination would be 
based on the state of mind of the prosecutor. Under this stan- 
dard, no precedent would be possible. In one instance, examin- 
ing evidence could be investigative, but in another case examin- 
ing evidence could be "preparation for a possible trial."ls3 
In conclusion, the Buckley probable cause standard, with 
its objective reasoning and set guidelines, should be preferred 
not only by the courts but also by prosecutors. As Justice Scalia 
stated in a previous opinion, "[aln immunity that has as many 
variants as there are modes of official action and types of rights 
would not give conscientious officials that assurance of protec- 
tion that it is the object of the doctrine to provide."'" Prose- 
cutors no longer have to guess as to what is protected conduct. 
The Supreme Court in Burns determined that prosecutors are 
not always absolutely protected from suit. However, the Court's 
decision in Burns provided no clear guidance for prosecutors. 
The Court's holding in Buckley now provides a standard to de- 
termine when prosecutorial activity is not absolutely protected. 
Two critical questions remain unanswered after Buckley. 
First, the Buckley decision provides no guidance for determin- 
ing what investigative and administrative functions should be 
absolutely protected after probable cause is established. Sec- 
ond, although it is clear that a prosecutor is not always abso- 
lutely immune from civil suit, it is unclear whether a § 1983 
plaintiff has established a cause of action when the plaintiff 
pleads that prosecutorial misconduct occurred before a finding 
of probable cause. This part will analyze both issues and sug- 
gest possible answers. 
151. Id. at 2621. 
152. See Bucklq,  113 S. Ct. at 2625 ( K e ~ e d y ,  J., dissenting) (explaining that 
the courts are capable of determining the "difficult and subtle distinctions" between 
nonadversarial acts and preparation for trial). 
153. Id. at 2624. 
154. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643 (1987). 
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A. The Buckley Court Provided No Guidance for Determining 
What Investigative and Administrative Functions Should Be 
Protected After a Finding of Probable Cause'55 
The question of what would be considered investigative or 
nonadversarial conduct once a prosecution is begun remains 
unanswered. Both the dissent156 and majority15' opinions 
state that even after a finding of probable cause, a prosecutor 
can perform functions that would be investigative or adminis- 
trative and thus not absolutely protected. Although Buckley 
provides no direct guidance in determining whether absolute or 
qualified immunity applies to prosecutorial functions after 
probable cause exists, prosecutors are now in a better position 
to argue that absolute immunity should apply after a finding of 
probable cause. The Buckley holding could be interpreted as 
supporting a presumption of absolute immunity after probable 
cause exists.158 Pursuant to the majority's analysis, a prose- 
cutor is an advocate for the state after probable cause exists 
and therefore functions in an absolutely protected quasi-judicial 
role.'" However, just as  a judge is not protected for functions 
not related t o  her judicial role,160 neither should a prosecutor 
be protected for acts after probable cause exists that are not re- 
lated to the prosecutorys adversarial or quasi-judicial role?' 
Although neither opinion in Buckley gives direct guidance with 
respect to prosecutorial immunity after a finding of probable 
cause, the majority provided guidance to the extent the demar- 
cation line was clear and rational. 
155. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. a t  2616 n.5. 
156. Id. at 2625 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
157. Id. at 2615. 
158. This presumption would he based on the shift in the prosecutor's duties 
towards more strongly representing the state's interest in prosecuting. See supra 
part 1V.B. (explaining a prosecutor's multiple duties). 
159. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
160. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (holding that judges are 
not entitled to absolute immunity when acting in their administrative capacity). 
161. An example of a non-advocatory act after probable cause exists would be 
the deliberate destruction or suppression of exculpatory evidence. See Houston v. 
Partee, 978 F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1647 (1993); 
Henderson v. Fisher, 631 F.2d 1115 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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B. Has a $1983 Plaintif Stated a Cause of Action When 
Prosecutorial Misconduct Occurs Before a Finding of Probable 
Cause? 
After Buckley, a major question remains as to whether a 
5 1983 claim exists for improper prosecutorial conduct per- 
formed before probable cause exists. Justice Scalia in his con- 
curring opinion emphasized the difference between the question 
of prosecutorial immunity and whether a claim is cognizable 
under $ 1983. He stated: 
[Mlany claims directed a t  prosecutors, of the sort that are 
based on acts not plainly covered by the conventional mali- 
cious-prosecution and defamation privileges, are probably not 
actionable under 8 1983 . . . I think petitioner's false-evidence 
claims in the present case illustrate this point. Insofar as 
they are based on respondentsy supposed knowing use of fabri- 
cated evidence before the grand jury and a t  trial, . . . the 
traditional defamation immunity provides complete protection 
from suit under $ 1983. If "reframe[dI . . . to attack the prepa- 
ration" of that evidence, the claims are unlikely to be cogniza- 
ble under 6 1983, since . . . no authority [exists] for the propo- 
sition that the mere preparation of false evidence, as opposed 
t o  its use in a fashion that deprives someone of a fair trial or 
otherwise harms him, violates the Con~titution. '~~ 
The majority opinion also recognized the need to separate the 
issues of prosecutorial immunity and stating a cause of ac- 
tion.lG3 Whether a claim has been stated is a vital question. 
Contrary t o  Justice Scalia's position, it seems unlikely that the 
four justices in'the majority would find no cause of action. If 
they were to find no cause of action, then the decision in 
Buckley would be hollow. The decision would be of little sig- 
nificance because an injured plaintiff's claim would be dis- 
missed for failure to state a claim as opposed to dismissed 
because of absolute prosecutorial immunity from civil suit. It is 
more conceivable that Justices Stevens, Blackmun, O'Connor, 
and Thomas would followl~ the line of cases relating to Jam- 
162. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2620 (1993) (Scalia, J., concur- 
ring). 
163. "In general, the dissent's distress over the denial of absolute immunity for 
prosecutors who fabricate evidence regarding unsolved crimes . . . seems to conflate 
the question whether a § 1983 plaintiff has stated a cause of action with the 
question whether the defendant is entitled to absolute immunity for his actions." 
Buckley, 113 S. Ct. a t  2616 n.5. 
164. Note that Justice Scalia and the dissenting justices presumably would not 
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age actions against state officers who "maliciously tender[] false 
information to the prosecutor."165 
Just as other state officers, prosecutors who maliciously 
tender or produce false information should be subject to dam- 
age actions. Prosecutors acting in a role comparable to other 
state investigators should be granted the same degree of im- 
munity. The prosecutor's role as an investigative officer should 
not be repudiated, despite the fact that the prosecutor later 
functions in a quasi-judicial role.lG6 As previously noted,167 
this concept becomes clearer if one examines the functions 
being performed as if they were performed by two prosecutors. 
The first prosecutor fabricates evidence during the pre-in- 
dictment period and conveys the false evidence to another pros- 
ecutor detached from the wrongdoing. When analyzing whether 
a cause of action under 9 1983 exists, the function the first 
prosecutor performed should be treated similarly to a police 
investigator's actions. Whether this analysis would be applied 
find a cause of action under $ 1983. If the issue had been squarely addressed a t  
the time Buckley was decided, the court would have likely ruled at  least five to 
four that there was no cause of action stated in the complaint. However, the addi- 
tion of Justice Ginsberg in lieu of Justice White (who was one of the dissenting 
Justices) now makes it more plausible that a cause of action would be found. 
165. See Wheeler v. Cosden Oil and Chemical Co., 734 F.2d 254, 260 & 11-14 
(5th Cir. 1984) (explaining that circuits are divided on the issue of whether a 
cause of action is stated against police officers who give false information to prose- 
cutors). 
An additional case of great significance was recently decided in January 1994. 
In Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994), the Supreme Court held that there is 
no substantive due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from 
criminal prosecution when there is no probable cause. Id. at 813. The Court held 
that a citizen's right to be free from prosecution without probable cause must be 
judged under the Fourth Amendment. The Court stated that "[wle have in the past 
noted the Fourth Amendment's relevance to the deprivations of liberty that go 
hand in hand with criminal prosecutions." Id. at  813 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U.S. 103, 114 (1975)). Although "express[ing] no view as to whether petitioner's 
claim would succeed under the Fourth Amendment, since he [did] not present[] 
that question in his petition for certiori," id., the decision in Albright, nonetheless, 
should be interpreted as lending support to the viability of a claim against a pros- 
ecutor before a finding of probable cause. Therefore, under Buckley and Albright, a 
prosecutor acting wrongfblly and maliciously in a nonadversarial role (i.e., before a 
finding of probable cause) could be subject to suit if her actions led to a wrongful 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 
166. When functioning as a prosecutor the defendant would be protected by 
the traditional defamation immunity. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at  2620. (Scalia, J., con- 
curring). 
167. See sulvra note 93 (illustrating the function test as applied to investigat- 
ing and prosecuting a case). 
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by the Court, however, is an open question that the majority 
deliberately left undecided. lB8 
Buckley requires courts to focus on whether a claim has 
been stated as opposed to whether a prosecutor is absolutely 
immune from civil redress. The focus on whether a claim is 
stated is desirable. In a democratic society, it is preferable to 
focus on whether a redressable injury has occurred as com- 
pared to whether a government official should be granted im- 
munity for improper conduct. As Judge Urbigkit noted: 
Immunity for responsibility for public officials is not man- 
dated by the constitution nor even statute, but rather a public 
policy where the public to be protected is the miscreant public 
official a t  the loss and damage of the injured innocent citizen. 
Society cannot be sustained in a democratic system if arbi- 
trary, malicious and perjurious conduct is not considered to be 
both reprehensible and p~nishab1e. l~~ 
The Court's decision in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons is a laud- 
able effort to provide guidance in  a difficult area of the law and 
an important step in balancing the rights of injured citizens 
and the duties of prosecutors. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Imbler, Burns, and Buckley illustrate the evolution of pros- 
ecutorial immunity. In first addressing the issue of prosecutori- 
a1 immunity, the Supreme Court in Imbler held that prosecu- 
tors were generally entitled to absolute immunity. However, in 
applying a "function performed" as opposed to a "posi- 
tionlstatus" analysis, the Supreme Court left open the possibili- 
ty that  certain functions performed by prosecutors would not be 
absolutely protected. Fifteen years after Imbler, the Supreme 
Court in Burns readdressed prosecutorial immunity and held 
the specific prosecutorial function of giving advice to police 
officers was not absolutely protected. However, the Court in 
Burns did little to provide any standard to direct future cases. 
In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, the Supreme Court established a 
rational and operational standard. By determining that prose- 
cutors are not absolutely protected for functions performed 
before probable cause exists, the Supreme Court recognized 
168. See supra note 164. 
169. Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d 1287, 1301 (Wyo. 1990) (Urbigkit, J., 
dissenting), cert. granted and judgment vacated by 501 U.S. 1201 (1991). 
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rights of injured citizens while balancing the need to protect 
prosecutors' adversarial functions. In conclusion, the Buckley 
probable cause standard provides needed guidance in a contro- 
versial area of law and was a necessary step in the evolution of 
prosecutorid immunity. 
